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 In February 2018, video footage from a small unmanned aircraft system 
(sUAS) operated near McCarran Airport was posted to YouTube.  In the dramatic 
video, the unmanned aircraft can be seen taking off from a parking lot and 
climbing to an altitude in excess of 1,000 feet (AGL), when the drone’s camera 
revealed a passenger jet rapidly closing position on approach to nearby McCarran 
Airport (Pope, 2018).  In an apparent attempt to get a better view angle, the 
unmanned aircraft operator maneuvered the sUAS upside down and behind the 
aircraft.  The proximity of the sUAS to the aircraft revealed adequate detail to 
identify the plane as an A320, with the distinctive Frontier Airlines markings 
(Pope, 2018).   
 
 Only months prior, a U.S. Army UH-60M was struck by a Phantom 4 
sUAS while conducting military operations near Hoffman Island, New York 
(National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2017).  The midair collision 
caused minor damage to the helicopter’s main rotor blade (NTSB, 2017).  The 
NTSB identified the sUAS operator using a unique serial number affixed to a 
portion of salvaged drone wreckage (NTSB, 2017).  The NTSB found the sUAS 
operator’s actions causal to the accident, specifically noting “the failure of the 
sUAS pilot to see and avoid the helicopter due to his intentional flight beyond 
visual line of sight” (NTSB, 2017, p. 1).  Moreover, the agency determined the 
sUAS operator’s knowledge of regulations and safe operating practices was 
deficient and was a contributing factor in the accident (NTSB, 2017).   
 
 The common thread linking these anecdotes is a probable lack of 
compliance or safe operating behavior of sUAS operators. 
 
Problem 
 
The FAA has undertaken varied efforts to contain the problem of unsafe or 
non-compliant sUAS operations.  From June 2007 to May 2018, the FAA pursued 
action against 518 sUAS operators (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2018).  The spectrum of FAA responses to unsafe or unauthorized sUAS 
operations included compliance actions such as counseling or correction; 
administrative actions such as the issuances of warning notices or letters of 
correction; and legal enforcement actions such as levying civil penalties or 
suspending or revoking airman certificates (GAO, 2018).  Despite these diverse 
efforts to curb unsafe or non-compliant sUAS operations, the problem seems to be 
accelerating.   
 
Encounters between manned and unmanned aircraft are becoming 
increasingly common events.  “From February 2014 to April 2018, the FAA 
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 collected 6,117 reports of sightings of potentially unsafe use[s] of UAS” (GAO, 
2018, p. 1).  According to the GAO (2018), the number of reported UAS sightings 
by manned aircraft pilots increased by 19 percent in 2017 over the previous year.  
The FAA’s UAS Sighting Report Database—the source of GAO reporting data--
provides an indirect barometer of unsafe UAS operations within the NAS.  The 
FAA reportedly expects an elevated risk of unsafe UAS operations as more UAS 
platforms integrate into the NAS (GAO, 2018).   
 
In a rebuke to the FAA, the GAO (2018) concluded that FAA safety 
efforts are hindered by a lack of reliable sUAS operations data.  The report 
acknowledged that the agency is taking steps to close the data gap, such as 
assessing detection and tracking technologies, but these efforts are still underway.  
The agency relies on indirect methods of operational data collection such as 
accident and near-miss reporting.  To date, there have been few efforts to directly 
sample and assess operations data.   
  
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate potential aviation interference 
and safety hazards caused by small unmanned aircraft at an airport in Class C 
airspace.  This study represents the second of a multi-phase research project about 
sUAS safety risks to the National Airspace System.  The authors sought to detect 
unmanned aircraft activity passively using an RF detection device and assess the 
data based on NAS infrastructure within the collection area such as airport traffic 
patterns, approaches, departures, local airspace categories and other factors.  
Additionally, the authors conducted a temporal evaluation of sUAS flight 
locations in comparison with manned aircraft positional data to model midair 
collision risk. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The authors sought to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. What are common characteristics of sUAS flight locations? 
2. What are common characteristics of sUAS operations?  
3. What is the potential impact of detected unmanned aircraft activity to 
aerodromes and aviation operations? 
4. How effective are geofencing restrictions in preventing sUAS flights from 
entering protected areas? 
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 Methodology 
 
 This project utilized an applied research method using exploratory 
research and case study approaches.  The authors secured a DJI AeroScope to 
detect small unmanned aircraft activity near Daytona Beach International Airport 
(KDAB) in Daytona Beach, Florida.  The device was mounted to the top of a 
three-story education building and collected data for a 13-day period.  Data was 
evaluated to determine the number of individual UAS flights, establish a census 
of unique UAS platforms, determine operating locations, and measure maximum 
flight altitudes.  The authors also assessed temporal factors such as the day/time 
distribution of sUAS operations.  This research was performed in accordance with 
institutional review board protocols for the protection of human subjects. 
 
After the sampling period, sUAS detection data was downloaded from the 
device.  Geolocation coordinates were input into EasyMapMaker, an online 
conversion tool used to generate KML datasets (Easy Map Maker, 2018).  KML 
data was imported into Google Earth Pro for further analysis.  The researchers 
integrated several georeferenced overlays into Google Earth Pro to further assess 
location data, including aeronautical chart data from the Jacksonville Raster 
Charts (FAA, 2018).  AirNav (2018) site data was used to determine location 
information for private heliports which were added to the aeronautical chart 
overlays to highlight additional aviation risk areas.  GoogleMaps data was used to 
identify operating locations proximate to detected sUAS positions.  UAS flight 
detection times were correlated with historical ADS-B data derived from 
Symphony OpsVue, a commercial software suite that records and queries 
historical NextGen surveillance data (Harris Corporation, 2018).  Geofencing 
location information was extracted from the DJI Fly Safe Geo Zone Map website 
and plotted as an overlay on Google Earth Pro to assess geofencing effectiveness 
(DJI, 2018). 
 
 
 
Data Collection: AeroScope  
 
 The AeroScope is a passive radio-frequency sensor designed to detect, 
identify, and track DJI-manufactured small unmanned aircraft.  The device 
collects, decodes, and records existing datalink communication signals exchanged 
between the sUAS remote controller and the aerial platform (DJI, 2017).  The 
AeroScope collects and records a wide variety of telemetry and parametric data 
on sUAS platform activity conducted within electronic line of sight of the sensor 
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 including: aerial vehicle location, remote controller location, home point, vector, 
altitude, speed, serial identification, and other parameters (DJI, 2017). 
 
Assumptions & Limitations 
 
The authors acknowledge the following study assumptions and limitations: 
 
• The 13-day collection period was a notable limitation of the study.  
Operational activity may vary seasonally and require longer collection 
periods to accurately capture. 
• The AeroScope device only detects DJI-manufactured platforms.  
According to Skylogic Research (2017), it is estimated that the DJI 
holds a market share of 72%.  Parrot and Yuneec each hold an 
estimated 7% market share, with other manufacturers making up the 
final 14% of the market. 
• The AeroScope device detects only platforms within electronic line-of-
sight.  In the event the sensor view of the UAS is impeded, the device 
may register the same sUAS platform as a separate flight. 
• Some DJI platforms are not fully supported for AeroScope 
identification.  The device has a known issue identifying DJI Matrice 
100 platforms, which inadvertently display as “unknown” platform 
types. 
• The authors assumed that manned aircraft altitude 
reporting/transponder equipment provided accurate data.  Historical 
aircraft traffic data derived from OpsVue does not include aircraft that 
lack Mode C, Mode S, or ADS-B Out capability.   
• The authors were unable to assess which operational ruleset individual 
sUAS platforms were operating under (i.e. [FAA Reauthorization Act 
of 2012] 333 Exemption with Certificate of Authorization, 14 CFR 
107, 14 CFR 101[E], 14 CFR 107[D] waiver, etc).   
• The authors did not assess the impact of weather conditions or other 
environmental or seasonal factors. 
 
Findings & Discussion 
 
The AeroScope was deployed on an educational building adjacent to 
Daytona Beach International Airport from May 17, 2018 through May 29, 2018.  
During the sampling period, the AeroScope detected 192 individual sUAS flights 
from among a total detected population of 73 separate DJI platforms.  Two data 
points were removed from this dataset, since they did not contain geolocation 
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 information.  Cumulative data regarding the detected population of sUAS 
platforms and related number of detected flights is presented in Figure 1.   
 
The DJI MavicPro was the most commonly detected platform, 
representing 36.6% of all flight detections (n = 70), followed by the Phantom 4 
(24.6%), and the Phantom 3 Standard (18.3%).  While the Mavic Pro and 
Phantom 4 platforms appear to make up a larger segment of the sUAS population, 
the utilization ratio suggests that operators are flying the MavicAir nearly twice as 
often as MavicPro or Phantom 4. 
 
 
Figure 1. UAS population and flight count detected during sampling period. 
  
Detection Date/Time 
 
 On average, the most prevalent flying days were detected mid-week on 
Wednesdays and Thursdays.  The mean detection rate for Wednesday was 29 
flights-per-day and Thursday was 21.5 flights-per-day.  It is likely that these 
results may be highly skewed due to the limited collection window, as well as 
other seasonal or temporal factors not considered within the scope of this study. 
 
UAS detections occurred as early as 01:24 and as late as 23:49 local time 
(L). The preponderance of flight activity—nearly 17.3%--occurred between the 
hours of 19:00-20:00L.  The mean detection time was 15:48L, with the median 
detection time being 16:48L. Results are presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  (Left) Average UAS Flights by Day of Week. (Right) UAS Detection 
Time (L) Distribution Histogram. 
 
 
 
 
Detection Altitude 
 
 UAS flights were detected at altitudes ranging from ground level to as 
high as 1,286 feet AGL.  UAS operated at a mean altitude of 238 feet AGL and a 
median altitude of 195 feet AGL. 
 
At least 6.8 % of platforms (n = 13) were detected in excess of 400 feet 
AGL, which included eight platforms between 400-500 feet AGL, two platforms 
between 500-1,000 feet AGL, and three platforms above 1,000 feet AGL. Results 
are presented in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3. Altitude distribution of detected UAS flights (AGL). 
 
Operating Location 
 
 UAS detections ranged from as close as 0.83 statute miles (SM) to as far 
as 10.58 SM from the detection device, which was located proximate to the 
Daytona Beach International Airport.  Figure 4 depicts a proportional breakdown 
of detection locations.  The majority of detections occurred within urban areas 
surrounding Daytona Beach (Center), Ormond Beach (North), and Port Orange 
(South).  Nearly 48.7% of detections occurred in residential neighborhoods, with 
28.3% occurring near single-family homes, and 20.4% near multi-family 
structures.  Commercial, industrial, or public properties accounted for 21.5% of 
detections.  Only 23 detections (12.0%) occurred near unimproved land and parks.  
This was an unexpected finding, as researchers anticipated that most operators 
would select relatively open areas that offered a safety buffer from obstructions, 
urban structures, and other hazards.   
 
The authors believe that these detection ratios are not generalizable, as this 
distribution is likely to change based on local factors.  In the case of Daytona 
Beach, it is likely that waterway detections are higher than most communities due 
to the proximity of the Halifax River and Atlantic coastline.  Additionally, the 
presence of the Daytona International Speedway likely creates a larger proportion 
of stadium or venue detections than would be encountered in many other 
communities.  
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Figure 4. Detected sUAS operating locations. 
 
Distance from Aerodromes 
 
 Of particular interest to researchers was the relative location of detected 
sUAS activity proximate to local aerodromes.  Researchers calculated the distance 
from each sUAS detection location to the center point for 10 local aerodromes, 
which included three public airports, two private airfields, four heliports, and one 
seaplane base.  Unmanned aircraft operated as close as 0.50 NM to public airports 
and 0.35 NM to heliports.  Of the 190 data points, 96.8% (n = 184) were detected 
within 5 SM (~4.34 NM) of an aerodrome, with 84.2% (n = 160) detected within 
5 SM of two or more aerodromes.  Results are presented in Table 1 and Figure 5. 
Figure 6 shows a graphical depiction of detected sUAS relative to local 
aerodromes. 
 
Table 1 
 
UAS Detection Distance from Sample Location Aerodromes (NM) 
 
  DAB 29FL FA79 FL44 F15 4FL6 OMN 04FL 7FL6 EVB 
Min 0.50 0.35 0.66 0.90 0.99 0.45 1.20 1.41 0.84 5.33 
Max 10.39 9.96 12.50 10.93 10.92 11.92 15.78 17.58 15.50 20.81 
µ 4.25 4.06 4.84 4.82 5.02 5.53 8.29 10.72 8.88 12.31 
M 4.15 3.80 3.97 4.46 4.74 4.88 7.25 10.59 8.83 12.75 
Q3 5.79 5.76 6.61 6.12 6.80 7.52 10.78 12.80 11.63 15.08 
Commercial/Industrial
/Public, 41, 22%
Stadium/Venue, 7, 4%
Multi-
family/Apartment, 39, 
20%Single-Family Home, 
54, 28%
Park, 7, 4%
Roadway, 1, 0%
Unimproved land, no 
obstacles, 5, 3%
Unimproved land, 
trees, 11, 6%
Waterway, 20, 10%
Other, 5, 3%
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 Q1 2.50 2.58 3.24 3.14 3.26 3.36 5.98 9.10 6.82 9.23 
σ 2.11 2.01 2.55 2.21 2.41 2.70 3.32 3.14 3.39 3.65 
 
 
Figure 5. Plot of UAS detection range (NM) from proximate sample location 
aerodromes. 
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Figure 6. UAS detection locations with relative aerodrome locations.  Airports are 
displayed with green symbology, and heliports with red symbology.  Individual 
pins indicate initial detection location of sUAS with altitude in nearest hundreds 
of feet (AGL).   
 
Of the 190 data points, 66% (n = 126) were operated within the Daytona 
Beach International Airport Class C Surface Area.  No sUAS flights penetrated 
the outer Class C shelf.  Seven sUAS (3.7%) were operated within the Ormond 
Beach Municipal Airport Class D Surface Area [North].  One additional notable 
finding was a single sUAS operated within 0.3 NM from the Tomoka 
Correctional Institution.  Figure 7 displays sUAS detections overlaid on a VFR 
sectional chart.   
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Figure 7. UAS detections overlaid on sectional chart. Note: plotted locations 
represent initial detection location and does not account for sUAS movement.  
The adjacent numbers represent sUAS-reported detection altitude in nearest 
hundreds of feet (AGL). 
 
Risk Analysis 
 
 Researchers assessed sUAS detections against the FAA’s UAS Facility 
Map (UASFM) established for the Daytona Beach area as a barometer for 
potential interference with manned aircraft operations.  According to the FAA 
(2017a), “UAS Facility Maps show the maximum altitudes around airports where 
the FAA may [author emphasis] authorize Part 107 UAS operations without 
additional safety analysis” (p. 1).  According to FAA (2017b), UAS Facility Map 
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 maximum altitudes were established by a collaboration of local air traffic 
controllers, and air traffic management personnel.  “These FAA employees 
reviewed manned aviation approach and departure procedures, aircraft and 
helicopter operations, and a variety of other factors to determine where small 
UAS operations could operate safely” (FAA, 2017b). 
 
 Of the 190 data points, 93.2% (n = 177) were contained within a 
designated UASFM area.  The detected altitude of each sUAS was compared 
against the corresponding UASFM maximum.  At least 21.5% (n = 38) were 
determined to exceed the maximum defined altitude limits of their UAS Facility 
Map area.  A graphical depiction of sUAS detections overlaid against the UAS 
Facility map is contained in Figure 8.  Composite results are displayed in Figure 
9. 
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Figure 8.  UAS detections overlaid on UAS Facility Map near Daytona Beach, 
Florida.  Airports are displayed with green symbology, and heliports with red 
symbology. UAS detections depicted by colored pins with adjacent number 
indicating altitude in nearest hundreds of feet (AGL).  Green pins represent UAS 
flights that occurred below the maximum UASFM altitude; red pins indicate UAS 
flights that exceeded UASFM maximum altitude; cyan pins indicate UAS flights 
that were outside a UASFM defined area.   
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Figure 9.  Detected UAS flights in UASFM areas by altitude compliance with 
UASFM prescribed maximums. 
 
It should be noted that the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability (LAANC)—the FAA system designed to make use of UAS Facility 
Maps—has not yet been fully implemented across the United States.  LAANC is 
expected to be implemented at the Daytona Beach airport on July 19, 2018.  As 
such, compliance with UASFM altitudes were not mandatory at the time of the 
data collection.  Nevertheless, the authors assert that this data provides a 
reasonable gauge of the risk posed to aerodromes around the sample area.  
 
Historical Near Midair Collision/Encounter Analysis 
 
 To better understand the collision risk presented by sUAS, the researchers 
correlated sUAS detection times, loactions, and altitudes with historical aviation 
traffic data derived from ADS-B (Out), Mode C, and Mode S transpoder signals 
in the local area.  Altitude and range data were compared between the detected 
sUAS and nearest lateral aircraft.  Cumulative results are presented in Figure 10.  
A cross section of both aircraft and sUAS data detected within a one nautical mile 
(NM) proximity of each other is presented in Figure 11.  Several sample datasets 
were included to highlight specific risk cases.  UAS detection altitudes were 
converted to mean sea level (MSL) to align with the OpsVue aircraft altitude 
reporting datum. 
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Figure 10. Aircraft/UAS range and altitude differential in feet.  Positive values for 
altitude indicate the aircraft was higher than the UAS. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Correlated aircraft/sUAS range and altitude pairs displayed in feet.  
Red data points indicate aircraft altitudes, whereas blue data points indicate sUAS 
altitudes. 
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  Figure 12 shows sUAS activity along the Daytona Beach coastline, with 
parallel aircraft traffic.  Aircraft traffic is displayed in green with a data block that 
indicates altitude and speed.  The sUAS is located at the end of the blue bearing 
and range line at the altitude listed in white.  In this case, the detected sUAS was 
at 462 feet (MSL) with the nearest lateral aircraft 0.30 NM away at 650 feet 
(MSL).  Perhaps more notable is the second aircraft in the dataset.  Although 
slightly further away than the first, at 475 feet, the second aircraft was nearly co-
altitude with the sUAS.  Based on known local aircraft activity, it is likely both 
aircraft were performing banner towing operations.  Considering the low altitude 
and slow speed, it would be difficult for these aircraft to safely perform evasive 
maneuvers. 
 
Figure 12.  UAS activity near shoreline banner towing operations. (Data point 
#13)   
 
Case 2: Approach and Landing 
 
 Figure 13 was perhaps the most egregious finding among the dataset.  In 
this case, the sUAS was detected at 90 feet (MSL) within 0.25 NM from the 
approach path of Daytona Beach International Airport, Runway 7L.  Just seconds 
before this detection, an aircraft was on approach to Runway 7L.  Assuming the 
pilot was performing the published ILS approach, the aircraft would have crossed 
the Runway 7L threshold crossing at a height of 58 feet AGL (88 feet MSL).  It is 
highly probable that the aircraft descended through the UAS altitude while on 
approach.  A subsequent sUAS detection in the same approximate location was 
16
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 found at more than 190 feet MSL, but was not proximate to aircraft traffic.  See 
Figure 14.   
 
 
Figure 13. sUAS activity on DAB Runway 7L approach (Data point 48) 
 
 
Figure 14.  UAS activity near DAB Runway 7L (Data point 49). 
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  Eight unmanned aircraft were detected within 1 NM of the Daytona Beach 
International Airport center point.  The most common launch points included the 
nearby NASCAR Speedway parking lots (Figure 15), Volusia Mall parking lots 
(Figure 16), and commercial parking lots near Builder’s Square (Figure 17).  In 
the case of data point 41 (Figure 15) and data point 190 (Figure 16), detection 
altitude never exceeded ground level.  It is likely that established geofencing 
restrictions prevented the launch of both flights.  In contrast, data point 57 (Figure 
17), a sUAS was detected at nearly 200 feet (MSL) only 0.68 NM from the 
Runway 7L centerline.  Similarly, Figure 18 shows a sUAS detected at 58 feet 
(MSL) within 0.29 NM from the Runway 7L centerline. 
 
 
Figure 15.  UAS activity near south Daytona Beach Speedway parking lot (Data 
point 41).  
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Figure 16.  UAS activity over the Volusia Mall parking lot (Data point 190). 
 
 
Figure 17.  UAS activity near north Daytona Beach Speedway parking lot (Data 
point 57) 
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Figure 18.  UAS activity near Builder’s Square, a commercial sector near the 
Daytona Beach Speedway (Data point 59). 
 
Case 3: UAS Activity Above 500 Feet  
 
 Five detected sUAS flights were operated in excess of 500 feet AGL 
(~534 feet MSL), three of which were detected operating above 1,000 feet AGL.  
Such activity is hazardous to low-flying manned aircraft.  Regulations provide 
with few exceptions, that aircraft must operate at least 500 feet above the surface 
when flying in other than congested areas, and at least 1,000 feet above proximate 
obstacles when overflying congested areas (14 CFR 91.119).  Certain aircraft 
operations such as takeoff, landing, and helicopter flights are exempted from this 
rule, thus, some manned aircraft activity occurs at altitudes considerably lower 
than 500 feet.   
 
 Figure 19 highlights one relatively high-altitude sUAS flight proximate to 
the shoreline.  The many banner towing operations conducted near this area 
makes detection problematic.  Fortunately in this case, the nearest aircraft was 
offset from the sUAS operation both laterally and vertically.  Similarly, Figure 20 
displays historical aircraft traffic data for one sUAS flight detected in excess of 
1,200 feet (MSL) conducted above a residential community adjacent to a 
community golf course.  Again, the data did not show nearby aircraft activity at 
that time.  These findings demonstrate that at least some sUAS operations are 
penetrating altitudes traditionally reserved for manned aircraft operations. 
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Figure 19. High-altitude sUAS activity near Daytona Beach shoreline (Data point 
109) 
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Figure 20. UAS activity near Daytona Beach golf course community (Data point 
35) 
 
Geofencing Effectiveness 
 
 DJI sUAS platforms implement certain geofencing restrictions. 
Geofencing is one or more location-specific, programmed flight restrictions or 
limitations designed to prevent or restrict sUAS flights over or near areas that 
would create a security or safety risk (DJI, 2018).  Some geofencing zones do not 
prohibit flight, but provide a warning to operators of possible flight risks (DJI, 
2018).  Geofencing is generally tied to aerodromes, critical infrastructure, or other 
facilities or areas that prohibit or limit sUAS flights, such as airports, power 
plants or prisons (DJI, 2018).  For DJI platforms, geofencing is divided into four 
categories: 
 
• Warning Zones:  Operation in these zones prompts a warning message to 
operators on the sUAS user interface regarding risks contained within the 
zone. 
• Enhanced Warning Zones:  Operators receive a user interface message 
indicating that flight is restricted, however, the user can override the 
restriction(s). 
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 • Authorization Zones: Operators receive a user interface message indicating 
that flight is restricted, however, the user can override the restrictions by 
logging into the DJI Go application with a verified DJI account. 
• Restricted Zones:  Operators receive a user interface message and flight is 
prevented in the subject zone.  Such flight is only accessible with a special 
unlock code from DJI. 
 
All sUAS flights detected during the field sampling occurred within one or 
more geofencing zones.  The collection area contained one Restricted Zone, two 
Authorization Zones, two Enhanced Warning Zones, and five Warning Zones.  
Figure 21 shows the distribution of UAS flights occurring within each of the four 
categories of DJI geofencing.  Figure 22 displays sUAS detections with 
geofencing areas overlaid on a FAA Raster Chart.   
 
The detection data revealed that 100% of sUAS flights were conducted 
within two or more Warning Zones.  More than 85% of the sUAS flights took 
place within an Enhanced Warning Zone.  Only 7.4% of sUAS flights occurred 
within Authorization Zones; and, 6.3% of sUAS flights occurred within Restricted 
Zones.  Only two sUAS flights in the dataset (1.0%) were prevented from taking 
off due to flight limitations within a Restricted Zone.  As displayed in Figure 21, 
most geofencing zones are generally nested such that entry into a more restrictive 
area, such as a Restricted Zone, would also place the sUAS inside less restrictive 
Authorization Zones, Enhanced Warning Zones, or Warning Zones.  While sUAS 
platforms can interact with more than one zone type, the imposed operational 
limitations default to the most restrictive zone. 
 
 
452
162
14 12
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Warning Zone Enhanced Warning
Zone
Authorization
Zone
Restricted Zone
23
Wallace et al.: Evaluating sUAS NMAC Risk Using AeroScope and ADS-B
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
 Figure 21. Cumulative distribution of detected sUAS activity within categories of 
DJI geofencing zones. 
 
 
Figure 22. DJI Geofencing plotted on FAA VFR Raster Chart with selected 
heliport overlays.  Individual UAS detections indicated by pins with altitude 
displayed in nearest hundreds of feet (AGL).  Figure depicts four DJI geofencing 
categories with Restricted Zones in red, Authorization Zones in orange, Enhanced 
Warning Zones in cyan, and Warning Zones in green.  Geofencing data derived 
from https://www.dji.com/flysafe/geo-map on June 27, 2018.    
 
Conclusions 
 
Common Characteristics of sUAS Flight Locations 
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  The data suggests that cumulatively, single- and multi-family homes make 
up 48% of sUAS operating locations.  This data strongly suggests that a 
preponderance of sUAS operators are flying for personal use around their own 
residences.  Commercial, industrial, and public locations also appear popular 
flight locations of sUAS operations—primarily in parking lots or other adjacent 
open areas.  Unfortunately, researchers were unable to determine definitively the 
operational purpose(s) of the flights conducted over such areas.  The authors were 
particularly concerned that nearly 97% of all detected sUAS flights had been 
conducted within 5 SM of one or more aerodromes.   
 
 
 
 
Common Characteristics of sUAS Operations 
 
The data yielded significant information about common operator behavior.  
The MavicPro, Phantom 3 and Phantom 4 platforms were the most commonly 
detected unmanned aircraft.  UAS operators appear to favor platforms that cost 
around $1,000 that are capable of flight outdoors.  
 
 The data indicates that most flights take place on Wednesday and 
Thursday, however, this data may have been skewed by uncharacteristically poor 
weather that was encountered during a portion of the collection period.  Aside 
from this anecdotal observation, weather conditions were not assessed during this 
study.   
 
 Mean and median flight time data suggest that on average operators 
perform flights in the late afternoon hours between 16:00-17:00 (Local).  Peak 
operations were detected between 18:00-20:00L, which may suggest recreational 
flyer activity conducted after work. 
 
 Generally, flights were detected around 200 feet MSL, however, there 
were several outlying data points that significantly exceeded this altitude, 
including the three flights detected in excess of 1,000 feet AGL. These flights 
represent a particularly hazardous threat to manned aviation. 
 
Risk Assessment Based on Historical Aviation Traffic Data 
 
 Using UAS Facility Map information as a risk measurement metric, 21.5% 
(n = 38) of the 177 flights conducted within a designated UASFM area exceeded 
prescribed altitude limits for their operating area.  This data suggests that more 
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 than 1 in 5 sUAS flights presented an unmitigated risk to nearby manned aviation 
operations. 
 
 Historical traffic data appears to support this assertion.  While much of the 
data did not show evidence of historical near-miss events, two data points 
indicated uncomfortably-close operations that ultimately could have resulted in a 
collision.  In the case of data Point #13 (Figure 12), shoreline sUAS operations 
came within approximately 0.5 NM of not one but two aircraft, one of which was 
co-altitude with the sUAS.  Similarly, data Point 48 (Figure 13) detected a sUAS 
within 0.25 NM of an approach path at an altitude through which the aircraft 
descended to land.  Considering that close encounters with other aerial objects are 
generally rare events, finding two within the span of a 13-day sampling period is 
particularly troubling.  The recent GAO (2018) report documents a notable uptick 
in close encounter sightings of UAS, which is consistent with findings of this 
study.   
 
 Perhaps more importantly is the unknown human factor responses to 
sUAS encounters.  The risks and consequences of a direct collision may pale in 
comparison to pilot-induced aggressive evasion maneuvers, as was the case in 
Levin (2018).  A pilot’s natural, immediate response to maneuver—particularly at 
low altitude or airspeeds—can easily exacerbate an otherwise-survivable midair 
sUAS-aircraft collision into a fatal stall, spin, or other uncontrollable flight 
condition. 
 
Effectiveness of Geofencing 
 
 It should be noted that geofencing is not an industry-wide standard and 
such protections are not provided by all manufacturers.  Moreover, the authors 
strongly assert that geofencing does not alleviate sUAS operators from proper 
flight planning and airspace compliance responsibilities.  Geofencing primarily 
serves as a supplemental tool to aid sUAS operators in maintaining situational 
awareness and augmenting sound aeronautical decision-making and flight 
discipline.  Nevertheless, the data clearly shows sizable reductions in detected 
sUAS operations in more restrictive geofenced areas.  This suggests that 
geofencing zones are relatively ineffective at preventing or deterring operators 
from flying unless they impose operational restrictions. Warning Zones merely 
provide situational awareness to the sUAS operator about local risks and neither 
enforces any accompanying flight restrictions, nor requires the operator to 
acknowledge the user interface warning.  Authorization Zones provide some 
protection, as they require operator acknowledgement to override flight 
restrictions.  Authorization Zones provide even further protection, since the 
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 operator must login to their registered account to release flight restructions.  
Authorization Zones permit sUAS activity to be tracked back to a specific 
operator account, thus promoting accountability and responsibility.  Finally, 
Restricted Zones provide the most protection by curtailing all sUAS flights unless 
the operator inputs a unique unlock code.  Since this requires direct contact with 
(and documentation furnished to) the manufacturer, this Zone effectively creates a 
barrier to entry by which only operators with a legitimate need to fly will tend to 
undertake.  Succinctly, the authors assert that geofencing zones are only effective 
if sUAS operators are committed to proper flight planning, airspace compliance, 
flying responsibly, and using sound aeronautical decision-making skills. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Geofencing Integration with the Low Altitude Airspace Authorization & 
Notification Capability System 
 
 Manufacturer-imposed geofencing protections offer a viable solution to 
most problematic sUAS flights.  There is, however, a clear disconnect between 
geofencing protections imposed by manufacturers and safety risk acceptable to 
regulators.  The authors propose manufacturers consider modifying geofencing 
protections to align with the FAA LAANC UASFM grid system and impose 
altitude restrictions that align with UASFM altitude limits within each respective 
grid area.  The proposed geofencing would prevent sUAS operations in all 
UASFM grid areas unless an unlock code that corresponds to the respective grid 
is entered.  Unlock codes could be generated and delivered automatically.  The 
authors believe that such a system would better utilize manufacturer geofencing 
by integrating and supporting with the LAANC system, the existing risk 
management strategy adopted by the FAA.  
 
Enhancement of UAS Situational Awareness: Tools for Pilots 
 
One key deficiency regarding sUAS operations is the lack of operational 
information sharing with manned pilots.  There is currently no effective means for 
manned pilots to assess sUAS activity along their route of flight.  This need is 
particularly relevant for flight operations by helicopters, aerial applicators, and 
other low-altitude NAS users that are likely to encounter sUAS activity.  While 
the LAANC system currently works to segregate sUAS operations from manned 
aircraft, it remains to be seen if this separation tool will be effective in preventing 
sUAS and aircraft encounters. 
To encourage information sharing, the authors propose the FAA strongly 
consider making LAANC request information available to manned pilots.  Figure 
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 22 illustrates the LAANC administrative tool currently used by FAA airspace 
managers.  The tool shows LAANC airspace segments, maximum segment 
altitudes, and utilization data.  Such information could be invaluable to manned 
aircraft pilots who wish to avoid sUAS activity while flying at low altitude.  
 
Figure 22.  LAANC Administrative Tool.  Provides LAANC segment 
information.  Maximum altitudes of each segment are listed in black text, with 
utilization data indicated by numerical values in the white circle of each 
respective segment.  The administrative tool contains filters that can display 
active authorizations or cumulative authorizations, including approved 14 CFR 
107.205(h) airspace waivers.  Used with permission, courtesy of Baum (2018).  
 
To further reduce the risks posed by UAS activity to manned aircraft 
pilots, the author proposes “a method to furnish essential safety information to 
pilots in cockpits of manned aircraft through the use of Flight Information Service 
- Broadcast (FIS-B), as well as through other services and protocols. As proposed 
by Baum (2018), this information would provide enhanced awareness of nearby 
sUAS operations within active Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) airspace; 
as addressed in this paper, it will make such information available within Low 
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 Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC)-enabled airspace.  
According to Baum (2018), “[t]his proposal responds to the regulatory obligation 
of manned aircraft pilot to be familiar with all available information concerning a 
flight, to avoid operating an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a 
collision hazard, and to see and avoid.” A conceptual prototype of the display 
output is presented in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23. Conceptual display prototype of proposed ADS-B FIS-B/AIXM 
communication of active LAANC segments. Active segment locations are 
displayed with representative symbology with accompanying maximum altitudes 
in hundreds of feet (AGL). 
 
Future Research 
 
 The authors intend to replicate this research at additional airports.  A 
future iteration of this work will employ the AeroScope device to determine 
sUAS operator compliance with LAANC approval restrictions.  Additionally, the 
authors intend to evaluate sUAS flight behavior to identify potential security risks 
to critical infrastructure. 
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